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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twelve years there has been increasing scrutiny of the
ways in which society deals with young people, especially those who violate
its norms. Calls for comprehensive changes have been issued by the
courts,1 national organizations, 2 child advocacy groups,3 and national and
state commissions.4 Although changes affecting the treatment of young
people in our nation have been recommended in many areas, those relating
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investigate Juvenile Delinquency. Member U.S. Supreme Court Bar and California Bar.
*** Director, Standards Program, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Law
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1. E.g., Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Gross v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Tinkerv. Des Moines School District,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2. Eg., R. KOBETZ & B. BOSARGE, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, 218 (1973); NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PLATFORM § 3.65 (1976);
AMERICAN LEGION NATIONAL EXECUTIVE CoMtTTE, -RESOLUTION No. 43 REMOVAL OF STATUS
OFFENSES FROM JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION (1975); National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Jurisdiction over Status Offenders Should Be Removedfrom the Juvenile Court: A Policy Statement,
21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97 (1975).
3. Eg., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN OUT OF SCIIOOL IN AMIERICA (1974); AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION JUVENILI RIGHTS PROJECTS, POSITION PAPER ON STATUS OFFenDERS (1975);
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT § 3148 and § 821, HEARINGS BEFORETHE
SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF THE COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 443-50 (1972-1973) (remarks of Flora Rothman,
National Board of National Council of Jewish Women); id. at 179-81 (remarks of theNational Board
of YMCAs); E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION (1973); K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THlE PLAYTIME
OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S INCARCERATED CHILDREN (1976); Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles, in
PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 119 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976).
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TIHE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
[hereiiafter cited as PCLEAJ], TASK FORCE REPORT. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUm CRIME
(1967); WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, REPORT TO TIlE PRESIDENT (1970); NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION [hereinafter cited as
NACJ"DP]; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO TIlE ADMINISTRATOR ON STANDARDS FOR TIlE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: SEPTEMBER 30, 1976 (1976); NACJJDP, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON STANDARDS FOR TIlE ADMINISTRATION OFJUVENILE
JUSTICE: March 30, 1977 (Advance Draft 1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS [hereinafter cited as NACCJSG], REPORT OF TIlE TASK FORCE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE. A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1977) [hereinafter cited as LA-ABA STANDARDS]; [01110]
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN (1976) [hereinafter
cited as OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT]; WISCONSIN COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SPECIAL STUDY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS
(1975); GOVERNOR'S ADULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 2 STANDARDS AND GOALS
FOR THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Final Draft 1977).
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to juvenile justice have been focused to a great extent on three sets of
issues: the rights and procedures applicable to youths in juvenile court
proceedings; the rights and policies which should apply to juvenile
correctional programs; and the deinstitutionalization of non-offenders.5
This article will explore the nature and scope of the examinations of these
three aspects of the juvenile justice process at the national and state levels,
and summarize recent efforts by a number of states to respond to the
problems which have been raised.
I. CALLS FOR CHANGE-A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Juvenile Court Procedure
In a series of relatively recent cases, the United States Supreme Court
has closely scrutinized the juvenile court process and found it lacking.
Kent v. United States6 was the first of these decisions; indeed, it was the
Court's first review of the fundamental fairness of juvenile court
adjudications since the first juvenile court was established in 1899. 7 The
issue in Kent was the applicability of due process requirements to ajuvenile
court's decision to waive its jurisdiction over a youth and permit a case to
be transferred to a court having jurisdiction over adults accused of
committing a criminal offense. On statutory grounds, the Court held that
there must be a hearing which "measure[s] up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment," and that a child's counsel must have access to
social records which could be considered by the juvenile court in making its
decision.8
Kent was followed a year later by the landmark decision of In re
Gault,9 in which the Supreme Court held that in any delinquency
proceeding in which juveniles are in danger of losing -their liberty through
commitment by the juvenile court, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that they be afforded the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine under oath the witnesses against them, and
the privilege against self-incrimination.'0 Although the decision decreed a
sharp departure from the practices employed in the particular juvenile
court which had adjudicated Gerald Gault, and in most other juvenile
5. The term nonoffenders encompasses juveniles alleged or adjudicated to be neglected,
dependent, or abused, as well as juveniles alleged or adjudicated to have engaged in a "status offense,"
"Status offenses" involve conduct which is unlawful for juveniles but not for adults such as running
away, truancy, or being "beyond parental control," "incorrigible," or "in need of supervision." See
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, § 223(a)(12), 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (Supp,
V 1975), as amended by Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-115, § 4(c)(7), 91 Stat.
1048 (1977); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATUS OFFENDERS: A WORKING DEFINITION (1975),
6. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
7. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE, 12-13 (1974).
8. 383 U.S. at 562.
9. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
10. Id. at 34-57.
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courts around the country, the Supreme Court saw no inconsistency
between introducing due process protections into juvenile court proceed-
ings and the parens patriae philosophy which underlay the establishment
of separate juvenile courts. In Gault, Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the
Court, observed that
[w]hile due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree
of order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceeding to determine
delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some elements of the
adversary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly
juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite .... 11
This effort to "strike a judicious balance '1 2 in determining what
constitutes the "essentials of due process and fair treatment' t3 is evident in
the three other Supreme Court reviews bf juvenile court procedures. In
the decision of In re Winship,14 the majority of the Court concluded "that
the observance of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will not
compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of
the juvenile process. 15 In Breed v. Jones, 6 which applied the protection
against double jeopardy to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court, Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, again stressed that
giving respondent the constitutional protection against multiple trials in this
context will [not] diminish flexibility and informality to the extent that
those qualities relate uniquely to the goals of the juvenile-court system.' 7
While the Supreme Court has expressed continuing doubts regarding
the efficacy of the juvenile justice process, 8 it has been reluctant to extend
its "constitutional domestication"' 9 of the juvenile court to matters which
would require fundamental changes. Thus, in McKeiver v. Pennsylva-
20exedta
nia, it declined to extend the right to a trial by jury to delinquency
proceedings, and in other cases it has declined to consider whether
judicially operated intake services violate the right to a trial by an impartial
finder of fact,2' or whether New York's and California's status offense
statutes were void for vagueness.22
11. Id. at27.
12. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 62, 74, 234 A.2d 9, 15 (1967).
13. 383 U.S. at 562, (quoted in 387 U.S. at 30).
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15. 387 U.S. at 21, (quoted in 397 U.S. at 367).
16. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
17. Id. at 535.
18. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,543-57 (1971); In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
19. 387 U.S. at 22.
20. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
21. In re Pima County Anonymous, 110 Ariz. 98,515 P.2d 600(1973), cert. denled,417 U.S. 939
(1974).
22. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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The examination of juvenile court procedure has also been
undertaken by a number of national standards-setting groups. 23  These
efforts have attempted to define and recommend ways of implementing the
rights mandated by the Supreme Court,24 by suggesting additional
safeguards which should be applied, 25 and have explored alternative
means for handling matters which now ordinarily come before thejuvenile
court.26
B. Corrections and Treatment
Scrutiny of the detention and correction components of the juvenile
justice process has also yielded the question whether due process
protections are being provided within th6 context of the rehabilitation
rationale of the juvenile justice system. Attention has been focused
primarily on the disciplinary procedures used in juvenile detention and
correctional facilities; the question has been asked whether the physical
condition, staffing patterns, programs and procedures of those facilities
permit the individualized care and treatment that is the premise for
maintaining a separate system of juvenile justice. In Nelson v. Heyne,27
for example, one federal district court ruled that
-corporal punishment (in the form of beating juveniles with a "thick
board") violates the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment;
28
-administration of tranquilizing drugs for control purposes without
specific authorization by a physician violates ajuvenile's right to due process
and right against cruel and unusual punishment; 9
-juveniles are entitled to notice of institutional rules and sanctions; 0
-before juveniles can be placed in isolation, there must be notice of the
alleged violation, a hearing before an impartial fact-finder at which they are
entitled to confront their accusers and present evidence in their defense, and
a written record of the disposition (in a form "sufficient to permit an
administrative review") which demonstrates that isolation for a givenperiod
of time meets "the best treatment interests" of the child involved;
3
23. See generally authorities cited at note 4 supra.
24. See, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES supra note 4; NACCJSO,
supra note 4, at 16; NACJJDP, supra note 4,'at STANDARDS 3.132, 3.)34.
25. See, e.g., IJA-ABA Standards, PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4; IJA-ABA
STANDARDS, ADJUDICATION, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, APPEALS AND COLLATLRAL RLVIW,
supra note 4; NACCJSG, supra note 4, at chs. 12, 13; NACJJDP, supra note 4, at STANDARDS 3, 165,
3.172.
26. See, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEIIAVIOR, supra note 4; IJA-ABA
STANDARDS, POLICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, YotTII
SERVICE AGENCIES, supra note 4; NACCJSG, supra note 4, at ch. 10; NACJJDP, supra note 4, at
STANDARDS 3.112, 3.113, 3.143, 3.144, 3.153, 3.154; PCLEAJ, supra note 4, at 27.
27. 355 F. Supp. 4 5 1 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S,
976 (1974).
28. 355 F. Supp. at 454-55.
29. Id. at 455.
30. Id. at 457.
31. Id. at 456-57.
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-the decision to place a juvenile in isolation must be subject to regular
review of professionally competent treatment personnel, and the detained
juvenile "given reasonable access to his peers and treatment staff, and a
reasonable amount of reading and/or recreational material, and opportuni-
ties for daily physical exercise";
32
-outgoing mail cannot be opened and only incoming mail in "receptacles
reasonably likely to be designed to carry contraband" can be opened absent
the showing of a compelling state interest; 33 and
-because of overcrowded conditions, lack of trained staff, and lack of
individualized treatment programs, juveniles confined in the Indiana Boys
School had been denied the right to treatment to which they are entitled
under the laws of the State of Indiana and the federal Constitution.34
In affirming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit observed:
When a State assumes the place of ajuvenile's parents, it assumes as well the
parental duties, and its treatment of its juveniles should, so far as can be
reasonably required, be what proper parental care would provide. Without
a program of individual treatment the result may be that the juveniles will
not be rehabilitated, but warehoused, and that at the termination of
detention they will likely be incapable of taking their proper places in free
society; their interests and those of the state and school thereby being
defeated.3"
In Martarella v. Kelley,36 the District Court for the Southern District
of New York ordered the closing of a detention facility housing girls
pending adjudication or implementation of a dispositional order because
the physical conditions of the facility violated the residents' eighth
amendment rights. It declared further that at a facility for boys
the shortage of key staff members . . . , their lack of training, the poor
communication among them, the shortage of information available about
the child to those who treat him [in addition to other deficiencies] .. . re-
sults in a failure to provide adequate treatment for the long term detainee.37
Citing Jackson v. Indiana8 and other cases indicating that due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment must bear "some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
ted,' 3 9 the court in Martarella held that with regard to long-term detainees,
the New York boys' facility violated the fourteenth amendment right to
due process as well as the developing constitutional doctrine of a right to
treatment.40
32. Id. at 456.
33. Id. at 458.
34. Id. at 458-59.
35. 491 F.2d at 360.
36. 349 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. Id. at 601.
38. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
39. Id. at 738.
40. 349 F. Supp. at 602-03.
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In Morales v. Turman,4' after examining the diagnostic, educational,
medical, mental health, disciplinary, and other treatment programs of the
training schools operated by the Texas Youth Council, the district court, in
a sweeping, highly detailed decision, ordered the closing of two training
schools as "places where the delivery of effective rehabilitative treatment is
impossible. 42 In addition, the court ordered that
[w]ithin a reasonable period, making allowance for careful planning but not
for foot-dragging, the defendants must cease to institutionalize any
juveniles except those who are found by a respDnsible professional
assessment to be unsuited for any less restrictive, alternative form of
rehabilitative treatment. Additionally, the defendants must within the
same period create or discover a system of community-based treatment
alternatives adequate to serve the needs of those juveniles for whom the
institution is not appropriate. Those juveniles for whom close institutional
confinement is necessary must actually be treated. They may not be
abandoned as hopeless and simply warehoused until they grow too old for
juvenile facilities. In particular, those few juveniles for whom close
confinement is appropriate must be surrounded by a staff trained to meet
their special needs, in a virtually one-to-one ratio. In this era, when it is
common for teams of medical personnel and allied specialists and
technicians closely to monitor critically ill patients in intensive care units in
hospitals, it is not too much to expect that children whose entire lives may be
blighted if they do not receive adequate treatment and help should be the
objects of individual attention. It would be ironic indeed if the law may
require that every juvenile prior to incarceration be aided by a lawyer
devoted to the fierce protection of his individual rights, yet may consign the
child after incarceration to the status of a cipher, lost among hundreds of
other children.43
Minimum levels of improvement for each of the areas noted above were
specified in the opinion,44 and the relief order enjoined, inter alia, "the
widespread practice of beating, slapping, kicking, and otherwise physically
abusing juveniles in the absence of any exigent circumstances .. .
On appeal, the Morales decision was initially vacated and remanded
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failure to convene a three-
judge panel.46 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court and the
41. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864(5th Cir. 1976), rcv'd
and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. 383 F. Supp. at 121. The court stated that
measured by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing
society." . . . the confinement ofjuveniles in a facility that compares unfavorably with one
of the most notorious prisons in America is shocking and senseles.,. In addition to violating
their inmates' eighth amendment rights, Gatesville and Mountain View prevent the provision
of any meaningful treatment and thus violate the right to treatment as well. TheCourt finds
specifically that no reforms or alterations can rescue these institutions from their historical
excesses.
Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 125-26.
44. Id. at 72-120.
45. Id. at 77.
46. 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976).
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appellate court's decision reversed and remanded.47 In the most recent
decision in the Morales litigation, the court of appeals has again remanded
the matter to district court to determine whether the changes initiated by
the Texas Youth Council satisfy minimum constitutional standards. 48 In
so doing, the court of appeals, following the arguments of Mr. Chief
Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson,49
questioned the existence and wisdom of a right to treatment, suggesting
that most of the problems in this and other cases such as Pena v. New York
State Division for Youth 50 were covered by the eighth amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 5' It also characterized
district court's original order as "excessively detailed. 52
The Morales litigation has not deterred other courts from con-
tinuing the examination of juvenile detention and correctional
facilities.53 The conditions, practices and programs of Mississippi's
Oakley Training School were carefully reviewed by the district court
for the Southern District of Mississippi in Morgan v. Sproat54 before it
-enjoined use of the punishment unit at the training school (the Intensive
Treatment Unit) except under certain limited conditions and ordered that
juveniles placed in that unit must have such amenities as transparent
windows, lights, mattresses, blankets, sheets, pillows, tables, chairs, soap
and towels, and, in most cases, reading materials, mail, visitors, and
physical exercise and meals outside the unit;55
-required the implementation of procedures proposed by the school's
administration to assure reasonable access to counsel and the courts;56 and
47. 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
48. 562 F.2d 993 (1977).
49. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring). In O'Connor, a case involving long-term
confinement in a state mental hospital pursuant to a civil confinement order, the Courtstated thateven
if the original confinement has a constitutionally adequate basis,"it could not constitutionally continue
after that basis no longer existed. . . . A finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simplecustodial confinement." Id.
at 575. In a concurring opinion, the Chief Justice criticized the Fifth Circuit's use of the right to
treatment doctrine. Id. at 578-89. However, he specifically distinguished O'Connor from such cases
as Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), on the grounds that there was no evidence or finding
that Donaldson was abused or mistreated, that failure to provide treatment aggravated his condition,
or that the general quality of life at the hospital resulted in the confinement becoming" 'punishment'
for being mentally ill." Id. at 588 n.9. This distinction may have important implications in future
cases involving the confinement of delinquent juveniles, particularly when status offenses, neglect, and
abuse are involved. See Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
50. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
51. 562 F.2d at 998-99. See also Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
52. 562 F.2d at 999.
53. E.g., Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morganv.
Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
54. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
55. Id. at 1140.
56. Id. at 1159.
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-mandated the development and submission of a plan to improve the living
conditions, staff size and training, counseling, and educational and
recreational programs at the school so as to meet the "fundamental
conditions in an institution which will allow adequate treatment to take
place," and thus protectjuveniles apainst cruel and unusual punishment and
denial of their right to treatment.
The apparent uncertainty over the right to treatment has not
prevented the various national standards-setting groups from directing
considerable attention to detention and dispositional policies affecting
juveniles and to the conditions, staff, and programs available in facilities in
which young people are placed pending or following adjudication by the
juvenile court. Six of the volumes of standards recommended by the IJA-
ABA Joint Commission are totally devoted to this area, "1 and at least three
others address it in part.59 These recommendations include detailed
criteria on decisions to place and hold juveniles in custody,60 suggested
maximum lengths for dispositions in delinquency cases based on the
seriousness of the offense,6 an outline for a state department of juvenile
corrections, 62 and design characteristics, procedures, minimum staffing
levels, and programs for residential facilities.63
The Report of the Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention covers the same topics in less
detail. 64 The Report of the National Advisory Committee on Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention proposes, in addition to criteria for
detention and dispositional decisions, highly specific standards for the staff
and services which should be available in training schools, and somewhat
more general criteria for the staff and services which should be provided in
camps, ranches, group homes, foster homes, and detention centers.6" The
rights of juveniles subject to supervision by a juvenile justice agency, and
the procedures which should apply to the revocation of probation, the
57. Id. at 1140-57.
58. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS,
POSITIONS, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURES, supra note 4. IBA-ABA
STANDARDS, THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, CORRECTIONS
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, ARCHITECTURE OF FACILITIES, supra note 4.
59. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANcTIONS, supra note 4; STANDARDS
5.1-6; IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, STANDARD 2.105. IJA-ABA STANDARDS,
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 4, STANDARDS 4.1-4.4, 6.1-7.5.
60. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 4, STANDARDS 3.1-3.6,5.6, 6.6,7.6; IJA-
ABA STANDARDS, DISPOSITIONS, supra note 4, STANDARD 2.1.
61. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTICNS, supra note 4, STANDARDS
5.1-6.4.
62. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, STANDARDS 2.1-3.6,
9.1-9.4.
63. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, ARCHITECTURE, supra note 4, IJA-AB A STANDARDS. CORRECTIONS
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, STANDARDS 4.1-8.9, 9.2.
64. NACCJSG, supra note 4, STANDARDS 12.7-12.12, 14.1-14.32, 19.1-24.6,
65. Id. STANDARDS 4.21-4.27.
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transfer to more secure facilities, and the use of mechanical restraints are
also discussed.66 Each of these groups place strong emphasis on the use of
the least restrictive alternative and the utilization of community-based
services.67
C. Deinstitutionalization of Non-Offenders
Much concern has been voiced over the current response to juveniles
who absent themselves from home or school, who are at odds with their
parents, or who have been neglected or abused. Calls for changes in this
area draw on themes described in both the juvenile court and treatment
areas. Although a few cases have addressed the issue of what type of out-
of-home placements are appropriate for alleged and adjudicated non-
offenders,68 the most significant calls for change have come from the
Congress and a variety of citizen and professional groups. In 1967, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice raised blunt questions regarding the wisdom and efficacy of
coercive intervention and incarceration for noncriminal misbehavior.69 In
1972 and 1973, the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Judiciary Committee held, under the chairmanship of Senator
Birch Bayh of Indiana, extensive hearings on the problems of juvenile
delinquency and runaways and the federal, state, and local responses to
these problems. Those hearings drew testimony from a number of
individuals and organizations regarding incarceration conditions and
practices, focusing particularly onjuveniles held because of conduct which
would not be a crime if committed by an adult. Included among the
witnesses were a number of young people who testified about conditions
and practices in jails and in detention and correctional facilities from first-
hand experience.70  As reported by the Judiciary Committee,
[a] clear consensus emerged from the hearings supporting strong incentives
for State and local governments to develop community-based programs and
services as alternatives to traditional processing. This approach was felt to
be particularly advantageous to non-criminal status offenders and neglected
or dependent children.
.. . Evidence was presented regarding flagrant mistreatment of juvenile
offenders, brutal incarceration of non-criminal offenders and the in~ffec-
66. Id. STANDARDS 2.231-2.233, 2.33, 3.151-3.158, 3.181-3.1813, 4.31-4.82.
67. In addition, a self-examination of the juvenile corrections field is now underway under the
auspices .of the Commission on Accreditation of the American Correctional Association.
68. See, e.g., In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y. 2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424,347 N.Y.S. 2d 51(1973). Pena v.
New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Blondheim v. State, 84
Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975).
69. PCLEAJ, supra note 4, at 27.
70. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AcT-S. 3148 AND S. 821: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF TilE COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY.
UNITED STATES SENATE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972-1973): TlE DErENr Io AND
JAILING OF JUVENILES: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATEJUVENILE DELINQL'ENCY OF
THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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tiveness which had marked a grossly inadequate Federal approach to the
prevention of juvenile delinquency.
The Congressional deliberations culminated in the passage of theJuvenil 72 .
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, which was
signed into law on September 7, 1974. A primary purpose of this
legislation was to stimulate the development of alternatives to traditional
facilities and practices in order to fill the gap between ignoring the needs of
troubled youths and continued reliance on incarceration. 7' As amended
in 1977,74 the Act provides, inter alia, for formula grant funds to states that
agree to remove those juveniles presently held in correctional and
detentional facilities "who are charged with or who have committed
offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult, or such
nonoffenders as dependent or neglected children. . ." 75 States
accepting formula grant money must also provide thatjuveniles alleged or
found to be delinquents, status offenders, or non-offenders cannot be
detained or confined in any institution in which they have "regular
contact" with incarcerated adults accused or convicted of committing a
crime.76 The Act further provides for coordination of federal juvenile
justice and delinquency prevention programs, for research, for technical
assistance, and for training to provide alternatives to incarceration and to
protect the rights of young people."
Joining in this nonpartisan call for removing non-offenders from
training schools, detention centers, and other detention and corrections
facilities, and in some instances urging the removal or substantial
limitation of the jurisdiction of juvenile and family courts over status
offenses, are many diverse national groups. These include the American
Legion, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National
Association of Counties, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency,78 and the American Civil Liberties Union.79
71. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th Cong., I st S :ss., REPORT ON S. 1021 (1977),
72. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).
73.
The act was designed to prevent appropriate young people from entering our failing
juvenile system. It is designed to assist communities in develbping more sensible and
economic approaches for youngsters already in the juvenile system. . . .Under its
provisions the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the Department of
Justice must assist those public and private agencies who use prevention methods in dealing
with juvenile offenders to help assure that those youth who should be incarcerated are jailed
and that the thousands of youth who have committed no criminal act-status offenders, such
as runaways-are not jailed, but dealt with in a healthy and mo-e appropriate manner.
123 CONG. REC. S12988 (daily ed. July 28, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
74. JuvenileJusticeAmendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-115,91 Stat. 1048 (1977) (amending42
U.S.C. § 5601 (Supp. V 1975)).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5633(a), 10(H), (12)-(14) (West Supp. 1978).
76. Id. § 5633(a)(13).
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5614, 5618, 5634-39, 5651-61, 5711 (West 1977 & Supp, 1978).
78. See generally authorities cited at note 2 supra.
79. See also THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTIoN AcT-S.3148 AND S.821:
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II. CALLS FOR CHANGE-A STATE PERSPECTIVE
In addition to judicial review of the juvenile justice process, the work
of Congress and the work of groups and commissions with a national
constituency, a number of states have embarked on reexaminations of
their methods for dealing with troubled and troubling youth. Notable
examples of such efforts are the report of the Juvenile Justice Task Force
appointed by Ohio Attorney General William J. Brown, the juvenile
justice standards and goals reports prepared for the Wisconsin Council on
Criminal Justice, and the report of the New Jersey Governor's Adult and
Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee.80
Ohio's efforts in this area are exemplary and worth examining in some
detail. The Ohio Juvenile Justice Task Force was formed to undertake
"the first comprehensive review of juvenile corrections reform in Ohio in
half a century . . . [and] to review . . . [Ohio's] 25-year-old juvenile
code, . . . [its] 75-year-old juvenile court system, and . . . [its] 120-
year-old state reform school system."8' The Task Force set three
objectives for its work:
(1) making the system more useful, and more beneficial to, the
children it serves;
(2) making the system less wasteful, and more accountable, for the
use of public resources;
(3) making the system as equitable as possible, less arbitrary, and less
discriminatory. 2
In seeking to achieve these objectives the Ohio Task Force addressed each
of the sets of issues discussed in the previous section.
A. Procedures
In the area of juvenile court procedures, the Task Force stated that
"the best interests of all people are served by assurance of the fullest
extension of due process of law to children at all stages of the entire
juvenile justice process," and urged a "comprehensive and badly needed
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF TIlE COsIM. ON TIlE
JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 44849 (1972-
1973) (supplementary statement of Flora Rothman, National Board of National Council of Jewish
Women); NATIONAL BOARD OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR SAFER CITIES, JLRISDICTION OVER
STATUS OFFENSES SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT (1975); IJA-ABA, STANDARDS.
NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 4; NACCJSG, supra note 4. STANDARDS 12.8. 14.23;
NACJJDP, supra note 4, STANDARDS, 2.232, 3.153, 3.182, 3.1881, 4.21, 4.24, 4.26; NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 574 (1973);
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN 382. But see NATIONAL COUNCIL OFJUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURT JUDGES, 1977 RESOLUTION (1977).
80. See authorities cited at note 4 supra, see also MICHIGAN ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 2 CRIMINALJUSTICE GOALS AND STANDARDS FOR THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1975); GoTRNOR's
COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, 2 NEW MEXICO STANDARDS AND GOALS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTFEM (1977).
81. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at iv.
82. Id. at 2.
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revision" of the statutes concerning governing juvenile court records to
protect against their unwarranted disclosure and misuse.83 In addition,
the Task Force's Drafting Committee on Court Standardization outlined a
series of specific changes in the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Ohio
Revised Code to increase the consistency of the procedures employed by
Ohio juvenile courts and to assure both the fairness and the appearance of
fairness in Ohio's juvenile courts.84 It stated that
[t]he most important point emerging from the purpose of juvenile court as
stated in Juvenile Rule 1(B) is that the juvenile court is indeed a court, and as
such it is concerned with procedural regularity to secure due process for all
juveniles appearing before it. Although many disciplines apart from law
.are found in juvenile courts more so than in other trial courts, which many
times leads citizens to perceive that juvenile court is a social agency in
disguise, the committee stresses that juvenile courts are based on the law."
B. Corrections
With regard to corrections, the Report advocates the closing of Ohio's
Fairfield School for Boys and razing "the unsafe and unhealthy structures
which have become dumping grounds for thousands of Ohio's young men
over the past 100 years."86 The money saved by closing the school is to be
returned to the local governments "to help every Ohio community care for
its own children as close to home as possible."87  The Task Force urges
that except for one or two small, secure institutions for the few juveniles
who are truly dangerous, Ohio's correctional system should consist of
small, community-based detention facilities with strong enforcement of
basic, humane standards of care:88 "We must end the astronomical waste
of human resources and public dollars now spent on large state institutions
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id. at 120-40. These recommendations include: advisingjuveniles of their right to counsel at
each step of the proceedings; limiting waiver of counsel to older juveniles and assuring that such a
waiver is "knowing and intelligent"; providing counsel to all indigent children even when non-indigent
parents refuse to provide counsel; allowing a juvenile rather than the court to determine whether a
juvenile's court proceeding should be open or closed to the public; preparing a verbatim record of all
juvenile court proceedings; requiring a written explanation, on the request of the juvenile, of the
"treatment benefits" that the court believes will be derived from the disposition and an explanation of
which less restrictive alternatives were considered and the reasons for their rejection; amending Rule 45
to require reference to Ohio's civil and criminal rules of procedures before local rules could be
promulgated; modifying Rule 48 to require all referees to be attorneys aid amending Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2151.16 to require that referees be assigned on a random basis unless the child requests a referee
of a particular sex; interpreting Rule 4(a) to require representation for the state by local prosecuting
attorneys in juvenile court proceedings, applying the rules of evidence in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure to juvenile proceeding; amending Rule 32 to prohibit judges from ordering or consulting a
social history of a juvenile prior to adjudication; establishing procedures and criteria for intake in the
Rules of Juvenile Procedures.
85. Id. at 121.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id. at 18, 51; See also L. OHLIN, A. MILLER, R. COATES, JUvNILE CORRECTIONAL RFORNM
IN MASSACHUSETTS (1977).
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that operate as revolving doors and training grounds for criminals."8 9
Furthermore, the Task Force strongly recommends amending Ohio's
Revised Code section 2151.312 to prohibit placement of juveniles in
county jails. It proposes the use of alternatives as well as development of
"decent places of detention and genuine community services."' 9
C. Deinstitutionalization of Non-Offenders
Finally, after observing that Ohio's existing "unruly child" law9 is a
"'catch-all' . . . for almost all behaviors of which a particular family or
particular court may disapprove," 92 the Task Force states:
Few conflicts between children and parents or between children and schools
should be brought before the court. Most are better resolved through
counseling, alternative learning arrangements and social service agencies,
while the jurisdiction of the court must be only a last resort, when all else has
been tried.
Therefore, it is recommended that Section 2151.022 of the Ohio
Revised Code be substantially revised and reduced to include only a few
specific behaviors within the definition of "unruly."
Specifically the statute should be limited to habitual school truancy,
habitual home truancy such as running away, and to a reference to those
other sections of the code containing specific prohibitions applicable only to
children.93
To this end, the Task Force proposed changes to the Ohio Revised Code
and current policy, which would, among other things,
-give the court in personam jurisdiction over parents in status offense
cases;
-provide for emancipation of minors at age sixteen providing certain
conditions are met;
-encourage the development of alternative learning arrangements and
counseling;
-hold schools accountable for the "vast numbers of youth expelled or
suspended";
-"coordinate and support adequate childcare and youth services in every
Ohio community and encourage their use . . .",
-and prohibit placement of accused or adjudicated status offenders injails
or juvenile correctional facilities, and, in addition, the placement of
pregnant, physically impaired or mentally ill juveniles in detention
facilities. 4
The Wisconsin and New Jersey standards and goals present even
more detailed blueprints than does Ohio for modifying their respective
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 50-51.
91. Id. at 37. See OHIO RE%,. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.022, 2151.354 (Page 1976).
92. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 37.
93. Id. at 37.
94. Id. at 37-53.
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juvenile justice systems. Hopefully, these proposals will assure that young
people receive the due process rights to which they are entitled, 95 and that
the treatment rehabilitation philosophy underlying a separate juvenile
justice system does not become simply empty rhetoric masking the same
kind of punishment meted out to adult offenders.
IV. THE RESPONSE
As a result of these clarions for change and the public concern over
crimes committed by young people,97 many legislatures across the country
have amended or totally revised their states' juvenile codes. 98 Several
more are now in the process of doing so.
In the judicial procedure area, several of these new or substantially
amended codes apply the rules of evidence applicable in adult criminal
matters to delinquency and other juvenile court proceedings, 99 and spell
out more clearly the right to counsel and other due prncess guarantees
applicable in juvenile court cases.00
The corrections/treatment area appears to have received less detailed
legislative attention. Several states, most notably Washington, have
enacted provisions to guide or limit judicial discretion in making
dispositional decisions in delinquency cases'0' or have included punish-
95. E.g., WISCONSIN COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 6-9,43.77-88; GOVt'RNOR'S
ADULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, supra note 4, at 774-89, 794-804.
96. With regard to corrections and treatment, see, e.g., WISCONSIN COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 5-6, 50-59, 93-111; GOVERNOR's ADULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, supra note 4, at 735-73, 805-86.
97. Of the nearly 8 million arrests during 1976 which are reflected in the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime
Report for that year, 24.9% involved persons under age 18. The peal: age for arrests for property
crimes-i.e., burglary, larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft-was 16 and the peak age for violent
crime-i.e., murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault-wa,. 18. C. KELLY, CRIMLINTIltr
UNITED STATES: 1976, at 181(1977). However, over one-fifth of all the arrests involving juveniles were
for running away, curfew and loitering violations, vagrancy, liquor law violations or drunkenness, or
were in connection with neglect, abuse, or other "offenses against the family and children." id. at 181,
303. Moreover, as noted in the REPORT OF THE OHIO JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at
24, the statistics on arrests may reflect the greater likelihood of appreheasion forjuveniles, rather than
their greater involvement in crime. See also M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIo, T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH COHORT 88-89 (1972).
98. E.g., California Assembly Bill 3121, Statutes of 1976, ch. 1071, (1976); 15 Mr. REV. STAT.
ANN. pt. 6 (Supp. 1978); LAWS OF UTAH 1977, ch. 76 (1977); VA. ACTS 1977, ch. 559 (1977); Wash, 3d
Subst. H.B. 371, 45th Legis., 1st Sess. (1977); W. Va. H.B. 1537 (1978).
99. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (Supp. 1977); 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3307 (1977);
W. Va. H.B. 1537, § 49-5-1 (1978).
100. Wash. 3d Subst. H.B. 371, supra note 98, §§ 37, 62(6), 08(2)-(3) (right to counsel in
dependency and delinquency proceedings including during diversion negotiations), §§ 62(4)-(10) (in
delinquency proceedings right of all parties to have subpoenas issued, verbatim transcription of all
proceedings, presumption in favor of open proceedings, adequate notice, discovery to the extent
permitted in criminal proceedings, opportunity to be heard and to confront witnesses, findings by an
unbiased fact-finder based on the evidence presented at the hearing, privilege against self-
incrimination, exclusion of statements or evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution,
requirement that all waivers must be intelligent and informed); 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN, § 3301
See also ,8 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-5038 (1977).
101. Wash. 3d Subst. H.B. 371 supra note 98, §§ 57, 69,70. See also 15 Mr. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 3313 (1977); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5034, 5037 (1977).
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ment and public safety among the purposes of the juvenile justice
system. 10 2  On the other hand, some statutes provide for added alter-
natives to detention or post-adjudication incarceration, demonstrat-
ing once again the effort to promote the equity of thejuvenile justice system
without undercutting its raison d'etre10 3 In addition, a 1977 amendment
to the West Virginia Juvenile Code sets forth a detailed bill of rights for
incarcerated young people.1°4
What is probably the most significant activity has occurred in relation
to the handling of status offenders. Maine has virtually eliminated court
jurisdiction over status offenses, placing responsibility for handling family
conflicts and school problems on the family, the schools, and government
services.10 5 Runaways may be taken into interim care bylaw enforcement
officer and may be held involuntarily for no more than six hours. t°6 A
juvenile taken into interim care can be held only in a shelter care facility,
foster home, or group home, and then, and only then, "if no other
appropriate placement is available, in the public sections of a jail or other
secure correctional facility if there is adequate staff to supervise the
juvenile's activities at all times."107 Utah now requires that cases involving
runaways or children beyond the control of their parents or school be
referred first to the division of family services. Only if "earnest and
persistent efforts" have failed can the matter be referred to the juvenile
court. 18 It is unclear, however, what impact, if any, this amendment has
on the provisions governing detention and disposition t1 9 Virginia and
Washington have barred or substantially limited the placement of status
offenders in jails, detention or correctional facilities.1
In addition to this legislative action, all but five states have agreed to
102. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 502(a) (Supp. 1977); Wash. 3d Subst. H.B. 371, supra note 98,§ 55(d), (g); 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3002(c)(1977). CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 707 (Supp. 19T);
W. Va. H.B. 1537, supra note 98, § 49-5-1(a) (making it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults).
103. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 654,731 (Supp. 1977); 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 3314; 34 ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 261 (1977); Wash. 3d Subst. H.B. 371,supra note94,§ 73(1). Seealso 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5035, 5039.
104. 14 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(b) (Supp. 1977).
105. 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (1977) does not include in the definition ofjuvenile crime
any conduct which would not be'a criminal offense for an adult, except possession of liquor. Sections
3501-3508 present alternative means for caring for runaways under the aegis of the Department of
Human Services. Runaway cases can be brought before the juvenile court in the form of a neglect
petition only if no living arrangement can be agreed upon by ajuvenileand thejuvenile's parents, or in
the form of an emancipation petition if thejuvenile is age 16 or older and meets the criteria set out in the
statute. 20 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 911, 914, 966, 3748 (1977) provide for the establishment of
alternative educational programs for habitual truants. 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3701-3704,
3803, 3891-3898 (1977) provide for family crisis workers and short term emergency services.
106. 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3501(l)-(2) (1977).
107. Id. §§ 3501(7)(B), 3502.
108. 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-16.5 (1977).
109. Id. §§ 78-3a-30, 78-3a-39; CoST AND SERVICE IMPACTS OF DE1NsTntrnoAuZATION OF
STATUS OFFENDERS IN TEN STATES: "RESPONSES TO ANCGRY YoUTrH" 48 (1977).
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 507(b)(1977); VA. CODE§§ 16.1-246,16.1-249 (19 ). Butsee§
16.1-279; Wash. 3d Subst. H.B. supra note 94, at §§ 34, 42.
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the conditions set by Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974, as anmended, for participation in the formula grant program
established by that Act. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention is supporting and preparing a number of discretionary grant
programs to encourage and provide incentives for the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of young people, and the use of alternatives to incarceration, and the
protection of the rights of juveniles.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the above discussion that the methods through
which we as a nation respond to children in trouble-those who victimize
society and those who are victims of it-are undergoing the most
substantial change since the concept of the juvenile court swept across the
country during the first decades of this century. Change does not
necessarily mean improvement. Nevertheless, with our increased
awareness of past mistakes and unfounded hopes, and with the greater
participation of young people-the consumers of the juvenile justice
system-in the decision-making processes,"' there is a genuine opportuni-
ty to assure that American youth is treated fairly, equitably, and with the
respect to which it is entitled.
I11. Eg., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5617(c), 5633(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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